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Introduction
The landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision, Crawford v. Washington,1 has
completely changed the traditional framework2 for evaluating the admissibility of
testimonial hearsay in criminal trials. The decision revives the authority found under the
6th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, specifically, one’s right to be confronted by the
witnesses against him in a criminal trial.3 Although the decision has only recently been
released, practitioners, courts, and academics alike recognize the enormous impact the
case will have on Confrontation Clause analysis.4 The following is an analysis of the
Crawford decision and its impact on the admissibility of testimonial hearsay. This
analysis provides a brief overview of the traditional framework used prior to the
Crawford decision in analyzing hearsay statements in relation to the Confrontation
Clause, the law as it stands now and a brief overview of some questions the Court left
unanswered. Lastly, this analysis takes a look at the recent Alaska Court of Appeals case,
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Teeth, 12 Nevada Lawyer 12 at 14 (September, 2004) recognizing that Crawford will have significant
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Anderson v. State of Alaska,5 and other Ninth Circuit cases that have interpreted
Crawford, and the impact these decisions will have on future evidence and Confrontation
jurisprudence in Alaska.
Factual Context
Michel Crawford was tried for assault and attempted murder after stabbing a man
who allegedly tried to rape his wife, Sylvia.6 Crawford claimed self-defense. At trial the
prosecution played the tape-recorded statements of Sylvia describing the stabbing, which
she had made during police interrogation.7 Sylvia’s statements were not entirely
consistent with her husbands as to the sequence of events leading up to the stabbing. At
his initial interrogation Crawford testified that he thought the victim had been reaching
for a weapon of some sort just before he stabbed him.8 Sylvia’s statements corroborated
her husband’s story for the most part, however, it was arguably different with regards to
whether the victim had drawn a weapon before Crawford stabbed him.9 Sylvia did not
testify at trial because of the marital privilege. Washington’s marital privilege does not
extend to a spouse’s out-of-court statements where the statements would be admissible
under a hearsay exception.10 The state used the “statement against penal interest”
exception to the general exclusion of hearsay statements, based on the fact that Sylvia
had led her husband to the victim’s home and helped facilitate the assault.11 The
prosecution used the statements to prove that the stabbing was not in self-defense despite
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Crawford’s inability to cross-examine his wife.12 Crawford argued that despite state law,
by admitting Sylvia’s statements without the opportunity to cross-examine her, the state
was violating his Sixth Amendment right to be "confronted with the witnesses against
him." 13
The trial court adhered to the traditional “adequate ‘indicia of reliability”
framework laid out in Ohio v. Roberts, 100 S.Ct. 2531 (1980), allowing statements of
unavailable witnesses to be introduced as evidence if the statement falls within a “firmly
rooted hearsay exception” or bears “particularized guarantees of reliability.”14 The trial
court allowed the statements to be introduced, finding that the statements bore particular
guarantees of reliability.15 The Washington State Supreme Court unanimously upheld
Crawford’s conviction on similar grounds.16 The court reasoned that the statement was
reliable because it was nearly identical to Crawford's own statement to the police, in that
both were ambiguous as to whether the victim had drawn a weapon before petitioner
assaulted him. 17 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to determine
whether the introduction of Sylvia’s statements at her husband’s trial violated the
Confrontation Clause.18 In a unanimous decision the Court reversed the Washington
Supreme Courts ruling in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia.19
Historical Background of the Confrontation Clause and Its Effect on Hearsay
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Justice Scalia does an excellent job at tracing the historical progression of the
Confrontation Clause and its impact on the admissibility of testimonial hearsay
statements stemming all the way back to Roman times. For purposes of this paper it is
much more useful to focus on the law as it stood just prior to the Crawford decision.
First, however, it is important to begin with a fundamental review of what the plain
language of the Confrontation Clause requires, and generally what hearsay actually is.
The Confrontation Clause provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right … to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” 20 The
basic premise is that, in our judicial system an accused cannot be tried with the aid of
testimony of a witness whom the accused has not had a chance to confront.21 Applying
that language strictly, it would mean that the introduction of any statements, made out of
court, without the declarant available for cross examination, would be unconstitutional.
Therefore, prosecutors, in order to introduce out-of-court testimonial statements, would
have to present the declarant at trial or forego introduction of the statements into
evidence. However, such a strict approach has never been applied and it has generally
been accepted that rendering all hearsay inadmissible would be impractical.22 Thus,
exactly what the Confrontation Clause requires has been subject to the Supreme Court’s
interpretation and the development of evidence law of individual states over the years.
The Crawford decision offers not a new interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, but
adherence to the traditional meaning of the clause.23
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While reading this it helps to keep in mind that hearsay is strictly an evidence issue
whereas Confrontation is a constitutional right. The two are not synonymous and the fact
that one is at issue does not necessarily mean the other will arise as well. Hearsay,
simply put, is “an out of court statement used to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”24
Hearsay includes such things as words, documents, and nonverbal conduct that was
intended to be an assertion (i.e. pointing, initialing invoices, smile coupled with silence,
other physical acts). Under the Federal Rules of Evidence the general rule is that hearsay
is not admissible,25 however, this rule is subject to significant exceptions.26 The
Crawford decision, as well as this paper, only addresses a specific kind of hearsay called
“testimonial hearsay.” The definition of testimonial hearsay is not entirely clear since the
Crawford Court expressly failed to provide a comprehensive definition (addressed in the
section dealing with questions left unanswered below) but it basically encompasses
statements made in previous court-like proceedings and in circumstances where it is
likely that they will be used later in court proceedings. A more comprehensive definition
of “testimonial hearsay” is provided below, but first a background review of the law as it
stood just before Crawford is merited.
Just prior to the Crawford decision the admissibility of out of court testimonial
witness statements was addressed through the framework laid out in Ohio v. Roberts.27
Under the Roberts’ framework, basically any hearsay statement that posed a
confrontation issue could nevertheless be admitted if it satisfied certain criteria.
Specifically, the statement would be admitted, despite the Confrontation Clause, if it bore
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adequate “indicia of reliability”.28 To be deemed reliable, courts would look to whether
the statement fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or was supported by
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”29 In some circumstances there was the
added requirement that the declarant be unavailable to testify.30
Over the years the Roberts’ framework and its offspring had drawn skepticism as
being too unpredictable, unmanageable, and in violation of the Confrontation Clause.31
The Crawford decision delivered the deathblow to the use of the Roberts’ framework
with regards to testimonial hearsay. The Court scrutinized the Roberts’ framework’s
shortcomings, and pointed to the fact that reliability is dependent upon a judge’s own
interpretation on which factors are important and how much weight will be afforded
those factors in different or similar circumstances, for different or similar reasons,32 and
that such inconsistency is not allowed by the Confrontation Clause when determining the
reliability of a statement.33 Moreover, the Court found that “the unpardonable vice of the
Roberts test is its demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial statements that the
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Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude.”34 The Court finally solidified what
many skeptics/scholars had been preaching: reliability is not something to be left to the
creativity of one’s advocate or the whims or any particular judge, instead the
Confrontation Clause “commands … that reliability be assessed in a particular manner:
by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”35
The Law Derived From Crawford- The New Test
So what exactly has Crawford left us with? Is all the previous hearsay and
Confrontation Clause precedent now null and void? Is the Roberts’ framework
completely dead? Is Crawford now the ultimate authority on the admissibility of
hearsay? What is the new test? Maintaining an all-encompassing perspective is the only
way to approach these questions. One must keep in mind the two areas dealt with here,
hearsay and the Confrontation Clause. These are separate creatures, each with a rather
expansive precedential history. First, I will examine the test to be taken from Crawford,
the parameters of that test, and some of the questions/issues that the decision leaves
unanswered. Finally, I will touch on some areas of the law that Crawford has left
untouched.
The Test
The test derived from Crawford is the result of an excellent exercise in logic
formulated by Justice Scalia. Even if one disagrees with the decision, praise must be
given for its craftsmanship. Building upon Justice Scalia’s extensive background
34
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Id. 124 S.Ct at 1370-71, 1364 (finding that the Constitution prescribes the procedure for determining the
reliability of testimony in criminal trials, and the Supreme Court, no less than the state courts, lacks the
authority to replace it with one of its own devising, and that “leaving the regulation of out-of-court
statements to the law of evidence would render the Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the
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analysis of the Confrontation Clause, the Court determined that the Clause’s history
supported two general principles about the purposes of the Confrontation Clause.
First, the Court determined that the most overriding purpose of the Confrontation
Clause was to protect criminal defendants from the civil law method of criminal
procedure, that is, preventing the use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the
accused, the overall goal being reliability of evidence.36 Furthermore, the Court
determined that the focus of the Clause within the previously mentioned purpose was
upon witnesses against the accused or those who offer testimony.37 Thus the primary
object of concern for the Confrontation Clause is “testimonial hearsay” (term discussed
below).38 The Court rejected the view that the Confrontation Clause only applies to incourt testimony “and that its application to out-of-court statements introduced at trial
depends upon "the law of Evidence for the time being."”39 A clear understanding of
Crawford dictates that this sort of approach to the Confrontation Clause is inconsistent
with the nature of the Clause as well as traditional principles of constitutional law.
The second principal supported by the Court’s historical investigation was “that
the Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness
who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had
a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”40 This exception was incorporated into the 6th
Amendment from English common law, which the Court determined was the only
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exception envisioned by the drafters since the language found in the 6th Amendment
leaves no open exceptions and this was the only exception in existence at the time the
provision was drafted.41
Thus the general rule to be taken from the Crawford decision is this: if the out of
court statement is testimonial, and the declarant is unavailable, the statement is
inadmissible as evidence against the defendant, unless the defendant had previously had
an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
Parameters of Test- Questions Left Unanswered?
It appears that for every answer the Crawford decision offers two questions are
created. On its face the test seems simple enough, however a second look offers glaring
gaps when its use is sought in the arena of practical application. The three linchpins to
the test are the words/phrases: “testimonial”, declarant “unavailability”, and “previous
opportunity to cross-examine” the declarant. Stop for a second and put on your lawyer
hat. Even if given their colloquial meanings, all three linchpins beg for an attorney’s
creative interpretation. The test is much more like a constitution than a steadfast rule of
law in that it functions more as a guide, outlining the parameters of the law. To say the
least, Crawford may have reduced the level of the pond but the water remains as muddy
as ever.
Hands down, the most exasperating aspect of the Crawford decision is the fact
that the Court failed to answer probably the most obvious question one would ask: what
exactly constitutes testimonial hearsay? In fact, not only did the Court simply overlook
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this problem, the Court expressly declined to offer any concrete definition.42 Courts
across the country now have the task of filling this void. However, the Court did offer
some guidance on this issue. For instance, it noted that certain types of hearsay like offhand remarks, business records, and statements in furtherance of a conspiracy are not, by
their nature “testimonial”.43 Another exclusion may be dying declarations. However, the
Court failed to definitively answer this question, instead offering only that if the dying
declaration exception must be accepted on historical grounds it is “sui generis”.44
Whereas the Court did offer, “[w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at a
minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former
trial; and to police interrogations. These are the modern practices with closest kinship to
the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed.”45 Professor Friedman offers
a more workable outline.46 He determined that the Court offered three standards but did
not choose any one of them for determining what makes a statement “testimonial”, they
include: 1.) “ex-parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material
such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable
42
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Professor Richard D. Friedman of the University of Michigan Law School submitted an amicus brief on
behalf of eight other law professors and himself in the Crawford case, additionally he sat second chair to
petitioner’s counsel, Jeffery Fisher, at the oral arguments in the Supreme Court.

to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect
to be used prosecutorially;” 2.) “extra-judicial statements … formalized in testimonial
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions” and 3.)
statements made in situations where an objective witness would conclude that they would
later be used in trial.47 Given the Court’s vagueness on this issue it is unavoidable, at
least in the interim, that absent a concrete definition from them each jurisdiction will
develop their own interpretations and tests as to what constitutes a “testimonial”
statement inevitably resulting in inconsistency.48
The Court placed some emphasis on situations involving governmental
involvement in the elicitation of the statement.49 No doubt in such circumstances it
would seem the most likely context in which a testimonial statement would arise. The
Court offered this distinction, “[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to government
officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an
acquaintance does not.”50 This is not to say that the presence or involvement of
government officials will be the determining factor as to whether the statement is
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testimonial or not, although it tends to lend itself as such in most situations.51 To the
contrary, there are many situations where such a standard would seem ridiculous.52
Similarly the Court was equally evasive when explaining whether it is the
perception of the declarant when making the statement that matters or whether it is the
purpose of the government official, or the perception of the person obtaining the
statement, that is determinative. One practitioner claims that “[t]he Crawford case
strongly implies that the status and motivations of the person eliciting the information,
not the perceptions of the declarant, should determine whether the right attaches.”53 On
the other hand the Court did quote, as an example of the different formulations of
testimonial statements, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers Amicus
brief which offered the opposite approach, "statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial[.]"54 Simply put, this “objective
standard” places emphasis on the perception of the declarant and no one else. Thus it
would appear that arguments could be made on either side.
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The second linchpin to the test appears to be the least confusing. As discussed
below,55 the body of case law developed under the Roberts framework for determining
when the declarant is unavailable has been left in place by the Court. Additionally, under
the Federal Rules of Evidence a declarant is unavailable for the purposes of offering
hearsay evidence in the following situations: death or illness, refusal to testify, they are
exempted by privilege, they cannot be found (absent), or they lack memory of the
specific statement.56 Only time will tell whether a rule of evidence will be incorporated
that expands or narrows this rule to take into consideration Crawford.
The last linchpin of the test offers not so much of an interpretational paradox as
the testimonial definition issue but is of equal magnitude in terms of importance. If the
accused has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant than Confrontation
has been satisfied. Again, sounds simple, however, this aspect of the test poses some
rather interesting questions and again is subject to creative lawyering given its vague
standing.
First off, does a prior opportunity to cross-examine a witness mean that the
accused must actually cross-exam the witness or simply be afforded the opportunity to do
so?57 This could be a particularly amorphous standard to develop. Second, what is the
benchmark for an adequate opportunity to cross-examine? What happens when there are
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claims of ineffective assistance of counsel? Will the standards be lowered for parties that
decide to go to trial pro-se? What happens when new facts/evidence is discovered by the
defendant after his opportunity to cross-examine had taken place? Will Crawford apply
retroactively?58 Is there a point when it is too early to present the accused with an
opportunity to cross-examine? For example what if a prosecutor decided to take a
deposition prior to charging an individual? In some situations it would seem that offering
the potential defendant an opportunity to cross-examine at this point would be
inconsistent with the purpose of Confrontation Clause. The whole idea behind the
Confrontation Clause is to address the reliability of evidence through cross-examination.
However, how is one to prepare a thorough cross-examination when all the issues have
not been identified? There must be a certain point where providing this opportunity
would be inadequate.59 For example, assume Daren (D) is being investigated for criminal
tax evasion and is given the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses against him at a
deposition prior to his being charged. Tax issues can be rather complex and time
consuming even with adequate preparation. Even if D had obtained competent counsel
how early in the game is too early? How would he know which issues to press or what
information he needed to provide to his lawyer so as to prepare a defense.60 These
questions make apparent there is significant room for argument. Through the parameters
outlined in Crawford courts across the country will have to answer these questions.
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Law Left Unaffected by Crawford
Through my research I have found an article, authored by an actual participant in
the Crawford case that does an excellent job of explaining what law Crawford leaves
untouched and what law Crawford will change.61 First, the Crawford decision did
discard the traditional Roberts framework in situations where testimonial hearsay is at
issue.62 Now it is inconsequential whether the testimonial hearsay statement falls under
one of the many firmly rooted exceptions or whether the statement displays adequate
indicia of reliability, when the statement is testimonial in nature the Confrontation stage
is set. However, this does not mean that Crawford is the new test for the admissibility of
all hearsay, Roberts is still very much alive.63 It is important to remember that hearsay
and the Confrontation Clause are two different areas of the law; they come together only
when the statement at issue is testimonial in nature.64 Therefore, it is crucial to
understand that where the statement at issue is “non-testimonial” Crawford places no
restriction on it and Roberts is still viable. This is not to say that Roberts’ framework is
not open to further challenge. To the contrary, given the strong language used by the
Court denouncing Roberts, I believe Crawford provides ample ammunition for other
challenges outside the testimonial hearsay arena, however this is an entirely different
paper altogether.
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Second, the statement offered must be offered for the truth of the matter that it
asserts, otherwise you do not have a confrontation issue65 nor even a hearsay issue for
that matter. Thus a prosecutor offering an out of court statement, if ethical, can make the
argument that the statement is not being offered to shed light on the truth of what it
asserts, but for some other reason such as offering the confession of a co-defendant
simply to show that the confession is substantially different from the defendant’s own
confession.66
Third, the Crawford Court reaffirms the rule derived in California v. Green,67 that
“[w]hen the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause
places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.”68 The obvious
reason being that the declarant is available to answer questions as to the prior statements.
“Fourth, in applying the unavailability requirement to prior testimony under the Roberts
regime, the Court developed a body of case law concerning when the prosecution has
adequately proven unavailability, and for better or worse that case law, including part of
Roberts itself, is left untouched.”69
Fifth, the traditional rule that one cannot benefit from their own misconduct still
remains in effect and they will forfeit their confrontation right in such situations.70 For
example one cannot cause the declarant to “disappear” or otherwise purposely impact the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. This leaves to question whether a murder
suspect may exclude his victim’s statements on Confrontation grounds or whether this
65
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qualifies as benefiting from their own misconduct. Surely at the time the murder took
place it was not the murder’s motive to prevent the victim from testifying as to his own
murderer. Such an argument would be absurd.
Sixth, Professor Friedman “presumes” the rule established in Maryland v. Craig,
479 U.S. 836 (1990), will not be impacted by the Crawford decision.71 There, “the Court
held that, upon a particularized showing that a child witness would be traumatized by
having to testify in the presence of the accused, the child may testify in another room
with the judge and counsel present but the jury and the accused connected
electronically.”72
Lastly, the Crawford decision does not disturb the rule derived from Delaware v.
Van Arsdall,73 “that a violation of the confrontation right may be deemed harmless and
therefore not require reversal.”74 As has been evidenced by numerous cases (discussed
below).75

Crawford’s Impact on Alaska
While writing this essay the Alaska Court of Appeals has handed down its first
decision grappling with the Crawford issue, Anderson v. State of Alaska.76 The decision
was handed down literally days ago at the time of the drafting of this essay. The court
formulated its own interpretation of what the Crawford Court meant by “interrogation”
and “testimonial” in adapting its test for the admissibility of testimonial hearsay. In the
71
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Anderson case police received a 911 call from a woman indicating that the defendant,
Joseph Anderson, had assaulted her.77 When officers arrived on the scene they found a
woman bleeding and very upset.78 The woman then told the police that someone else had
been hurt as well and took them to an apartment were an injured man was lying on the
floor.79 The officer at the scene noticed several bruises on the man’s torso and that he
appeared to be in a lot of pain.80 At that point the officer asked the man, “What
happened?” To which the man responded that “Joe” had hit him with a pipe.81 The
injured man did not testify at Anderson’s trial, however, the trial court allowed the officer
to testify as to his out-of-court statement identifying Anderson as the perpetrator, under
the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.82
Thus the issue before the Alaska Court of Appeals was whether the injured man’s
response to the officer’s question was testimonial under Crawford. Despite some
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authority to the contrary83 the court decided to “follow the emerging majority view on the
admissibility of excited responses to brief on-the-scene questioning by police officers.”84
The majority view holds that “an excited utterance by a crime victim to a police officer,
made in response to minimal questioning, is not testimonial.85 This approach basically
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(holding that children’s statements to grandmother that thirteen-year-old babysitter had sexually assaulted
them a year before were testimonial under Crawford.) (The Anderson court distinguished In re E.H.
because “[t]he victims' statements were not excited utterances and the statements were not made to the
authorities.” Anderson, 2005 WL 858773, at 5); Washington v. Powers 99 P.3d 1262, 1263-66
(Wash.App.2004) (holding that that a tape-recorded 911 call reporting a violation of a domestic violence
restraining order was a testimonial statement. Where “the Court concluded that the purpose of the 911 call
was to report a violation of the restraining order to allow the police to apprehend the defendant and was not
made "under the stress of immediate threat of harm nor was [the defendant] still present."” Anderson, 2005
WL 858773, at 5 (interpreting Powers), (the Anderson court distinguished Powers based on the fact that
“the statements were made in response to several questions and by the court's finding that the purpose of
the call was to initiate a criminal prosecution” Anderson, 2005 WL 858773, at 5); Lopez v. State 888 So.2d
693,700 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2004) (holding that kidnap victims statement to police identifying the kidnapper
was testimonial since victim had to know that his statement to the police was a "a formal report of the
incident that would be used against the defendant.")
84
Id.
85
Id. at FN 26 relying on the following authority and comments: “People v. Cage, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 846, 848
(Cal.App.2004) (holding that hearsay statement made at the hospital to police that defendant had cut him
was not testimonial because the interview was "unstructured" and "informal and unrecorded") petition for
review granted 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 824 (Cal.2004); Leavitt v. Arave, 371 F.3d 663, 683 n. 22 (9th Cir.2004)
(murder victim calls police night before death to report that defendant had broken into her home--court
concluded that this was excited utterance and non-testimonial because victim initiated contact, was not
interrogated, and her motive in calling was only to obtain "help in a frightening intrusion into her home");
Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 815 (D.C.App.2005) (holding that excited utterances made to police
officers are testimonial only when given in response to "questioning in a structured environment"); United
States v. Webb, 2004 WL 2726100, at p.4 (D.C.Super.2004) (Officer dispatched to scene of assault asks
victim "What happened?" Victim states that defendant punched her in the face. Victim's statement held
non-testimonial); Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 961-66 (Ind.App.2004) (held that statements to police in
response to informal police questioning at the scene of a crime shortly after crime occurred are not
testimonial); State v. Barnes, 854 A.2d 208, 211-12 (Me.2004) (Defendant charged with murder of his
mother. In an earlier incident, the mother went to police station in tears stating that defendant had tried to
kill her. Statements admitted as excited utterance. Mother's statements non-testimonial because she had
gone to the police on her own while under the stress of the alleged assault and police only asked questions
to determine why she was upset); People v. Bryant, 2004 WL 1882661, at p.1 (Mich.App.2004) (murder
victim's statement that "Rick shot me" was not testimonial because police had only asked "What
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questions and victim gave account of crime); People v. Mackey, 785 N.Y.S.2d 870, 874 (N.Y. City Crim.
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hones in on the “ex-parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent” standard, which
encompasses police interrogations and ignores the “objective standard”. The court’s
analysis focused on the definition of “interrogation”.86 Noting that the Crawford Court
offered simply the “colloquial” definition of interrogation, the Alaska Court of Appeals
turned to the dictionary for guidance.87 Based on these definitions the court determined
that the injured man was not being “interrogated” by the officer when he made the
accusatory statements since the questioning did not “seem to fall within the category of
formal, official, and systematic questioning.”88 The court felt that, in formulating its
opinion, the Supreme Court appeared “to be speaking of more formal statements than the
single excited response at issue in Anderson’s case.”89
The Anderson case is a product of other courts holdings and perhaps not the last
word on Crawford in Alaska. Indeed Crawford offers many other issues than the one
decided in Anderson. Given the inevitable presence of other Crawford issues in future
criminal litigation in Alaska an overview of how the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and

statement in response to police question if there was anyone else involved, that defendant "was the only
one" was not in response to a "structured question asked with an eye towards trial" but was designed to
secure the area, and also not testimonial. Victim's further responses to police questioning were testimonial);
United States v. Griggs, 2004 WL 2676474, at p.5 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (Police officer dispatched to scene hears
declarant say, "Gun! Gun! He's got a gun!" and observed declarant gesture towards defendant. Statement
held non-testimonial); State v. Anderson, 2005 WL 174441 (Tenn.Crim.App.2005) (holding that excited
utterances made to police officers responding to reported crime are not "testimonial"); State v. Maclin,
2005 WL 313977, at p.17 (Tenn.Crim.App.2005) (domestic violence victim's statements made to
responding police officer were excited utterances and not testimonial); Key v. State, --- S.W.3d ----, 2005
WL467167, at 5 (Tex.App.2005) (holding that excited utterance made by victim to officer responding to
scene of assault was not testimonial); State v. Orndorff, 95 P.3d 406, 408 (Wash.App.2004) (where witness
told police she saw man with a gun downstairs, saw two men leave, was panic-stricken and tried to dial
911, statement held to be non-testimonial).”
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other Ninth Circuit states have been treating the case is merited. Not surprisingly in
almost every instance the primary issue revolves around whether a particular piece of
hearsay evidence qualifies as a “testimonial” statement. An overview of these cases
provides an excellent example of how applying a different standard to similar facts will
result in different outcomes.
Testimonial vs. Non-testimonial Statements- 9th Circuit Interpretations
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has taken on the
“testimonial” definition issue in a few different cases. For instance, in Parle v. Runnels90
following a state court conviction of first-degree murder, the Court of Appeals denied a
defendant’s habeas corpus petition on his Confrontation Clause challenge to the
introduction of the murder victim’s diary entries.91 The court held the diary entries,
which contained detailed descriptions of abuse and arguments between the victim and the
defendant, where not the sort of out-of-court statements that Crawford was concerned
with because they were non-testimonial.92 In coming to this conclusion the court relied
upon one of its prior decisions dealing with the “testimonial” issue, Leavit v. Arave93 and
found that the diary entries where not created “under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that [it] would be available for use at a later
trial.”94 The court concluded that the diary entries where properly admitted under
California Evidence Code section 1370, citing the portion of Crawford that reads
“[w]here nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’

90

387 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. Nov, 2004)
Id. 387 F.3d at 1035-36
92
Id. 387 F.3d at 1037
93
383 F.3d 809,830 n.22 (9th Cir. 2004)
94
Parle, 387 F.3d at 1037 (citing Crawford, 124 S.Ct at 1364 and Leavit, 383 F.3d at 830 n.22 (9th Cir.
2004))
91

design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law—as does [Ohio
v. Roberts], and as would an approach that exempted such statements from confrontation
Clause scrutiny altogether.”95
However, in the earlier Arave case, the court used an entirely different standard to
deny a habeas petition. There, (as noted above in FN 86) a murder victim's statements to
police on the night before her death, regarding her suspicions as to identity of the prowler
at her home, were admitted in the defendant’s subsequent murder trial under Idaho’s
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.96 Denying the defendants habeas petition
as to the Confrontation challenge the court found that, “[a]lthough the question is close”,
the victim’s statements to the police the night before her murder were not testimonial.97
Instead of using the “objective standard” in reaching this conclusion the court utilized the
“ex-parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent” standard, which includes police
interrogations to conclude the statement was not testimonial.98 The court pointed to the
fact that the victim initiated the contact with the police and that the police where there to
help and that she was not being interrogated.99 The next case provides a similar example.
In the California state appellate case, People v. Compton,100 a murder victim’s
statements to police, at the crime scene and in the emergency room identifying the
defendant as the shooter, were admitted into evidence at the defendant’s trial under
California’s excited utterance exception and an exception for statements purporting to
narrate or explain the infliction or threat of physical injury upon the declarant.101 On
95
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appeal the court denied the defendant’s argument that his Confrontation right was
violated, concluding that the victim’s statements to the police implicating the defendant
where not testimonial because they were not made in response to police interrogation.102
The court cited an earlier case where it had determined that “[p]reliminary questions
asked at the scene of a crime shortly after it has occurred do not rise to the level of an
‘interrogation.’ Such an unstructured interaction between officer an witness bears no
resemblance to a formal or informal police inquiry that is required for a police
interrogation as that term is used in Crawford.”103 The court determined that while at the
crime scene and the emergency room the police were not conducting a “formal
investigation in which trial was contemplated”.104 They based this conclusion on the fact
that there was no suspect under arrest, and no determination had been made whether a
crime had been committed.105
Did They Get It Right?
It is my opinion that the Ninth Circuit was incorrect in its application of Crawford
in the Leavit case. There, Crawford was decided after the court had heard oral arguments
and it appears that the court felt the issue only merited discussion in a single footnote.
Their analysis is too simplistic. Had they used the same standard and analysis applied
months later in the Parle case the result surely would have been different. Clearly,
explaining a purported crime to police officers would constitute “circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that [the statements] would be
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available for use at a later trial.”106 It seems the court completely overlooked this
standard, perhaps to maintain harmony with the result that it had already reached. The
Compton and Corella cases provide similar examples where, in my opinion, the court got
it wrong. These cases exemplify how applying the “ex-parte in-court testimony or its
functional equivalent” standard will result in an entirely different result than if the
“objective standard” would have been used. To me the California Court of Appeals
reasoning contains the same flaw as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals above. Surely the
victim thought and hoped that the police would use his statements to bring to justice his
attacker. Under the objective standard this clearly would qualify as “testimonial” for
Crawford’s purposes. Furthermore, I disagree with the court’s reliance on Corella
because the court focused only on the interrogation question and ignored the other
standards offered by Crawford. Additionally, it would seem that Corella is inconsistent
with the purpose of Crawford in terms of what constitutes an interrogation. Corella
attempts to set a specific time and place on when an interrogation takes place and what an
interrogation is. This is completely in conflict with Crawford, which specifically points
out, the term “interrogation” was meant to be used in its colloquial form and not in any
“technical legal, sense.”107 By relying upon Corella the California Court of Appeals has
formulated a technical “legal” definition of interrogation in conflict with the express
language of Crawford.
In my opinion the Alaska Court of Appeals decision in Anderson suffers from the
same flaws as listed above. Courts are taking a conservative approach to Crawford and
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in doing so are misinterpreting the case by formulating their own legal definitions of
interrogation. Instead of viewing the “objective standard” and the “ex-parte in-court
testimony or its functional equivalent” standard as separate standards the court seemed to
mesh the two, or perhaps simply ignored the objective standard so as to be consistent
with the majority view. Had the court bothered to at least examine the objective
standard, instead of dismissing it outright, given the circumstances there, I think it is
obvious that a person identifying their assailant would reasonably expect that
identification to be used to arrest the person they identified. Furthermore, a reasonable
person in such circumstances would surely expect that his or her identification must be
used later on in trial.108 Therefore instead of getting bogged down with the definition of
“interrogation” the court should have simply focused on whether there was a reasonable
expectation that the identification would have been used at the defendants trial.
Child Abuse Cases
The state of Washington, the birthplace of Crawford, offers equally conservative
interpretations of what constitutes “testimonial”. In State of Washington v. Fisher,109 a
child abuse case, the Court of Appeals for the 2nd Division addressed the issue of whether
statements made to physicians in child abuse situations constitute testimonial statements.
Relying upon numerous other state cases dealing with the issue,110 the fact that the doctor
was not a government employee, the fact that the defendant was not yet under suspicion,
the fact that the doctor testified that she questioned the child only as part of her efforts to
108
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properly diagnose and treat the child and thus no indication of a purpose to solicit
testimony for trial existed, and that an objective observer, under the circumstances, would
not reasonably foresee the use of the statements in a future trial, the court held that the
statement was not testimonial and Crawford therefore did not apply.111 Thus the court
here used the objective standard to determine Crawford did not apply.
In another Washington Court of Appeals case, State of Washington v. Dezee112 a
child rape case, a mother testified as to out of court statements made by her daughter
indicating that the child’s father had raped her. In concluding the statements made by the
child to the mother did not constitute “testimonial” hearsay under Crawford, the court
relied on the following facts: the child’s statements were spontaneous, they were made to
her mother while riding in the car to school, the only apparent purpose of the statements
was expressing the child’ concerns with the acts and seeking comfort from her mother,
there was no indication that the child ever sought the involvement of the police, and
nothing in the record indicated that the nine-year-old reasonably believed the statements
would be available for use at a later trial involving her father.113 Here again the objective
standard was utilized.
DUI Reports
Montana has recently addressed the increasingly popular strategy of challenging
reports in DUI cases through Crawford.114 In State of Montana v. Carter115 the
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defendant claimed that his right to confront witnesses against him was violated when the
state introduced three certification reports (weekly, monthly, yearly) for a breath analysis
machine but failed to proffer the individual who compiled the reports for crossexamination.116 The court determined that certification reports for breath testing
instruments do not constitute “testimonial” hearsay and therefore does not raise a
Confrontation issue because “certification reports are not substantive evidence of a
particular offense, but rather are foundational evidence necessary for the admission of
substantive evidence.”117 However, many defense practitioners would disagree with
Montana courts decision. They would take the argument a step further claiming that, not
only must the person who performed the calibration or performed the actual breath test be
present at trial for cross examination, the also a technician who could testify to the “inner
workings” of the machine itself must also be present.118 A DUI practitioner’s article on
the subject offers the following argument:
“A machine and its results are clearly testimonial. In fact, it is the piece of
testimony necessary, and indeed often the only one needed, to prove a per se
charge. That being said, aren’t the inner workings of the machine necessarily
testimonial? …The printout of the machine is in court ‘saying,’ “here is the breath
(or blood) alcohol content of Mr. Defendant.” If this were a live person, the first
question we would ask is how did you determine this result? We would clearly be
allowed to ask about the science used, the calculations made, and the procedures
followed; yet, because it is a machine, we are denied this confrontation.”119
Some would argue that this type of reasoning is just another example of lawyers
trying to find loopholes for their clients and exploit the protections offered by our
Constitution. However, as technology progresses so must the law. As our society
115
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becomes increasingly dependent upon technology the likelihood that they will trust it
increases. This could have significant ramifications if you are a resolute government
conspiracy theorist. Indeed, it is shocking to think that our freedom could hinge upon a
machine. However, as the Kapsack article surmises, “our constitution does not yet
provide for conviction by machine”.120 I do not know whether I agree with that statement
or not, but I do know that Crawford will be the medium within which that battle is
fought.
Excited Utterance Heard by Lay Witness
An Arizona appellate court tackled the issue as to whether an excited utterance, a
hearsay-excepted statement, heard by a lay witness qualifies as testimonial under
Crawford.121 There, two out of court statements, one overheard by the victim’s son and
one the victim made to her brother-in-law over the phone the night before she was
murdered, were admitted into evidence under the “excited utterance” exception to the bar
on hearsay evidence. The court held that “an excited utterance heard and testified to by a
lay witness does not fit within Crawford’s definition of testimonial…”. The court
reasoned that Arizona State’s definition of an excited utterance122 is not “even remotely
similar to most of what Crawford offers as an example of a testimonial statement.”123
Specifically, the court reviewed the three standards outlined in Crawford and
120
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distinguished each one pointing to the fact that an excited utterance is not a solemn,
formal declaration nor is it the sort that would be found in ex-parte in-court testimony or
its functional equivalent; nor would a person making such an utterance reasonably expect
it to be used later in trial when they have no time to reflect on what they have said.124 In
holding that excited utterances heard by lay witnesses are non-testimonial the court also
cited other jurisdictions dealing with this issue and coming to the same conclusion.125
The court did note that in situations where the excited utterance is made in response to a
police officer’s questions there might be more room for a Crawford challenge.126
Co-Defendants Statements
In State of Oregon v. Page127 the Oregon Court of Appeals dealt with, what has
always been one of the most prevalent areas raising confrontation issues, hearsay
evidence of co-defendant’s statements to police. There the primary defendant was
convicted of several felonies stemming from a robbery committed by two men after the
initial arrestee made statements to the police implicating the primary defendant in the
felonies and made a deal to testify against the primary defendant for a reduced
sentence.128 However, when the primary defendant’s trial came to pass the initial arrestee
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refused to testify. The trial court deemed the initial arrestee unavailable129 and admitted
his interview statements under Oregon’s statement against penal interest exception to the
hearsay bar.130 This was before Crawford had been decided. On appeal the court
determined that the trial court’s admission into evidence of the testimonial hearsay
evidence of the unavailable codefendant’s statements to police violated Crawford and
was plain error.131 The court relied on the “police interrogation” benchmark provided by
the Crawford Court in determining that the statements where testimonial.132
911 Calls
Finally there is the growing controversy over how Crawford should apply to 911
calls. This issue has sparked numerous opinions from both academics and courts.133
The determining factor seems to be whether the police dispatcher elicited statements
from the caller in a structured manner. 134 Courts appear to be split on the issue, New
York in particular has had several conflicting decisions.135 These cases demonstrate that
it is not clear whether it is the perception of the caller that matters or whether it is the
129
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purpose of the police dispatcher that is determinative in deciding whether a 911 call is
testimonial or not. Within the Ninth Circuit courts are equally divided. In contrast to
the Conyers case, Washington v. Powers,136 a Washington Court of Appeals decision,
held that a tape-recorded 911 call reporting a violation of a domestic violence
restraining order was a testimonial statement.137 The court recognized that there were
two types of 911 calls, those were the caller’s objective is to “gain immediate official
assistance in ending or relieving an exigent, perhaps dangerous situation,” and those
where the caller seeks to “provide information to aid investigation to aid investigation
and possible prosecution related to the situation.”138 Based on the facts of the case
before them the court determined that the purpose of the 911 call was to report the
violation of the restraining order so as to secure the arrest of the defendant and was not
made "under the stress of immediate threat of harm nor was [the defendant] still
present."139 Because the caller sought to provide information for the defendants arrest
the statement was testimonial.
California, on the other hand, has taken a different approach. Instead of
differentiating between 911 calls where the caller seeks “immediate assistance” or seeks
to provide “information for prosecution”, California courts have simplified the issue by
embracing an all encompassing rule that “a telephone call to the police reporting a
crime, is not a testimonial statement.”140
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“A telephone call reporting a crime is not "given in response to structured police
questioning" related to a formal investigation. Rather, a citizen, often seeking
assistance, initiates the call. The operator receiving the call is not conducting an
investigation, but seeking information to determine an appropriate response to
the crime. Thus, statements made during a telephone call reporting a crime do
not implicate the right to confront witnesses.”141
The California court’s line of reasoning is questionable. Washington seems to be
more in line with the spirit of Crawford. Fortunately, the Supreme Court has granted
review in another California case that determined a 911 call was not a testimonial
statement.142 This could be the first step at carving out an actual hard core definition of
testimonial.
Harmless Error and Retroactivity
In another Ninth Circuit Appellate case the court found that the introduction of
out-of-court statements of a defendant’s girlfriend to police during a search, which
indicated that the defendant was the only one that could access a safe containing drugs,
was in violation of Crawford.143 The court found that the statements were testimonial but
offered no reasoning as to why they merited such designation.144 However, the court
ultimately determined that the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
considering the minor importance of the statements and the overwhelming evidence of
the defendant’s guilt.145
In Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3rd 1010 (9th Cir. Feb, 2005), a more recent Ninth
Circuit habeas petition, the court addressed whether Crawford applies retroactively and
revisited the harmless error doctrine. In Bockting the defendant was convicted of child
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sexual abuse and sentenced to life imprisonment. The only witness to the conduct was
his six-year old stepdaughter who did not testify at trial but whose interview with a
detective was admitted as key evidence. The statements of the step-daughter at the
interview contradicted statements the she made at a preliminary hearing, where she said
she could not remember what occurred with her father or whether she had talked with the
detective. The judge declared the stepdaughter an unavailable witness given the fact that
she could not remember and admitted the interview statements. The Court of Appeals
determined that admission of the interview statements without cross-examination was a
violation of Crawford. Applying the test for retroactivity outlined in Teage v. Lane,146
the court found that Crawford was both a “watershed rule” and “one without which the
likelihood of an accurate conviction was seriously diminished, and therefore applied
retroactively in the pending habeas proceeding”.147 In addressing the harmless error
argument the court found that because the stepdaughter’s testimony was central to the
defendant’s conviction “its admission can hardly be classified as harmless error.”148
Conclusion
The examples above make clear that there is no one test to apply and that
inconsistency is rampant when it comes to the Crawford issue. It appears that, in
determining whether a statement is testimonial, the states within the Ninth Circuit and the
Circuit Court of Appeals itself, place emphasis on whichever standard outlined by the
Crawford Court will ultimately gain the result they deem fit in the underlying case. This
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has led to inconsistency from state to state. Nonetheless, one thing is clear, courts have
adopted a rather conservative approach to Crawford.
It is my hope that this article illustrates how important it is for practitioners in
states that have not tackled the Crawford issue to keep up to speed with how their
particular circuits are interpreting the issues presented here. It is even more important
that practitioners have a working knowledge of the standards outlined in Crawford for
determining a testimonial statement so as to be able to make proficient arguments and
understand their implications, especially if they disagree with how their circuit is
interpreting the case. For now Alaska has taken the position that “an excited utterance by
a crime victim to a police officer, made in response to minimal questioning, is not
testimonial”.149 However, the Anderson decision address only one issue in the myriad of
issues that Crawford encompasses. For Alaska practitioners, I believe it is a safe bet that
future Alaska Appellate cases will continue the national trend and produce similar
conservative decisions. It appears that more instruction will be available in the near
future, the Crawford issue is again knocking at the doors of the Supreme Court at this
very moment.150
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